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This paper surveys the voluminous literature on migration affecting trade and the somewhat 
less developed literature linking aid flows to migration. We aim to guide the reader through 
the two literatures, highlighting key contributions and identifying important lines of enquiry. 
Simmering below the surface of both literatures is the issue of causation. Given the 
macroeconomic nature of the global flows under examination and the numerous direct and 
indirect links that potentially exist between them, establishing causality proves particularly 
problematic and is thus an issue that we pay close attention to throughout. The evidence 
from the trade and migration literature, in which causality has been more concretely 
established, suggests an almost ubiquitous positive effect of migration on trade, although 
exceptions exist. This suggests that richer data might be required to delve even deeper into 
the trade-migration nexus. While policymakers often wish that aid reduces migration, the 
literature suggests the opposite, namely that aid increases emigration. However, the 
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International trade, foreign aid and international migration are all key facets of globalisation, 
and are therefore likely to be interconnected. Between these three elements we can 
identify three separate dyads and therefore delineate six unidirectional pairwise links. Those 
between trade and aid do not belong in a paper on migration, but one might expect the 
remaining four to be discussed. In fact, we predominantly focus on the links running from 
migration to trade and from aid to migration. This choice is governed by the almost 
complete absence of any notable literature on the remaining two.  
Simmering beneath the surface of these literatures is the issue of causation. Changes in all 
three phenomena are connected by the general equilibrium adjustment of the economy to 
shocks. Thus a trade shock might affect the returns to factors of production, which in turn 
change the incentives for migration, but equally, a migrant inflow will influence the baskets 
of goods produced and consumed and thereby affect trade. Similarly, an aid flow may 
increase emigration by raising incomes in the recipient country, thereby allowing greater 
numbers of people to more easily afford the costs of migration; but additionally, a flow of 
migrants might affect average incomes (in either the sending or receiving country), which in 
turn may alter donor’s willingness to grant aid. Perhaps even more challenging, the three 
phenomena also share many common determinants including for example, shared culture, 
geographical proximity or a common (colonial) history. Pinning down causation in this melee 
is bound to be difficult and so the economics profession has devoted nearly all its effort to 
examining those links, which are both easier to identify and most pressing in terms of policy 
concerns. 
Every significant international migration flow around the world tends to arouse some form 
of opposition. So if one could show that migration led to an increase in something that was 
almost universally held to be a ‘good thing’ – viz. international trade – one could start to 
address that opposition. This, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, is the thrust of the 
majority of the studies linking migration and trade. A similar motive drives the migration 
and aid literature: if aid were to be shown to reduce migration voluntarily, would that not 
represent an attractive outcome for (at least some) policy-makers? In the same vein, trade 
liberalisation is often touted for similar reasons, i.e. that increases in income reduces 
emigration from developing countries. To our knowledge, however, the academic 
community has failed to produce convincing evidence that establishes a direct causal link 
from trade to migration.  
This paper first considers trade and migration. We start by identifying three seminal pieces 
of scholarship that have shaped the research agenda: one exploring the general equilibrium 
connections between them and suggesting that at least under certain conditions, trade and 
migration be substitutes, and two that address the ways in which migrants may directly 
reduce the costs and/or increase the benefits of international trade and so render them 
complements. From this base we discuss the methods and results of two decades of 
empirical research, which has explored the connection with increasing sophistication. As 
hinted above, the major challenge is one of identification – proving causation – and we 
organise the literature around various approaches to meeting this challenge. It is a story of 
considerable variety and ingenuity, and while no single exercise addresses all statistical 
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concerns concurrently, the very fact that so many different approaches seem to show 
migration bolstering levels of international trade is, in the end, fairly persuasive.1 
Part two of the paper examines the aid-migration connection. It begins by illustrating the 
extent of policy-makers’ yearning to hear that aid and trade liberalisation will reduce the 
pressure for emigration from developing to developed countries. It suggests reasons why 
this is probably not true in principle and why, even if it were, the magnitude of any such 
effect would be likely to be vanishingly small. We then survey the main studies relating 
migration directly to aid flows and show that overwhelmingly they conclude that, if anything, 
aid boosts migration. Finally, we briefly consider the history of the European policy of co-
development that attempts to place aid into a coherent policy framework, with the aim of 
reducing the pressure of migration to Europe. Prima facie, it has not been a success. 
International Trade and Migration 
 
Three Classic Papers 
This section discusses three seminal pieces of scholarship that constitute the foundations of 
modern research on the link between international trade and migration. First, we introduce 
the classic statement of the connection between international trade and international 
migration from Robert Mundell (1957). He observes that under precisely specified 
conditions, the neo-classical model of international trade, in which trade is determined by 
differences in countries’ endowments of factors of production, implies that ‘commodity-
price equalization is sufficient to ensure factor price equalization and factor price 
equalization is sufficient to ensure commodity-price equalization’. This implies that trade and 
migration are perfect substitutes.   
The fundamental premise of the neo-classical theory of international trade is that the 
incentive to trade arises from differences in countries’ relative costs of producing different 
goods, which, in turn, arise from differences in those countries’ endowments of factors of 
production. These endowments are assumed to be immobile between countries but mobile 
between sectors. Free (and costless) trade in goods between countries, ensures that goods 
prices are equalised across countries. Then, in its purest form, with two countries, two 
factors and two goods, as well as identical technologies between countries, neo-classical 
theory generates the remarkable prediction that free trade between two countries whose 
endowments are ‘not too different’ is sufficient to ensure that their factor prices are 
equalised, the so-called Factor Price Equalisation Theorem of Paul Samuelson (1949). If, on 
the other hand, trade in goods was restricted, so that goods prices differed, differences in 
factor prices would persist, and if international migration were costless, factors would move. 
If this occurred until factor prices were equalised, goods prices would also be equal, since 
technology is the same across countries. According to this theory, only the ratio of the 
endowments of the two factors matters for the costs of goods production, so it does not tell 
us whether labour, capital, or both, would move between countries, which in turn implies 
that labour and capital mobility are also substitutes. But if we assume that there are 
frictions to capital movement (as there certainly were in 1957), trade and migration would 
                                                            
1 Of course another explanation for consistency is publication bias, but the fact that we identify a number of 
published studies where migration is said to reduce trade should alleviate that concern somewhat.  
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be substitutes. Intuitively, this result is clear if one thinks of goods as bundles of their 
constituent factors, since then trade in goods and the migration of factors are two means to 
the same end.  
No-one, least of all Samuelson and Mundell, believes that the conditions assumed by the 
theory are valid in the real world. The casual evidence against them is simply overwhelming. 
Nonetheless, the basic insight is important and can be seen to operate, for example, in the 
way in which some agricultural production in developed countries depends on immigrant 
labour for its very existence – e.g. Martin (1997).  Moreover, once we move beyond strict 
neo-classical theory, by allowing trade to be determined by things such as technology 
differences or tax structures, international migration can increase trade rather than reduce 
it. Markusen (1983) explores these cases in an interesting way; he shows that if something 
makes producing a particular good in a particular location attractive beyond factor 
endowments, location matters (unlike in the neo-classical model) and factor mobility will 
occur to take advantage of these specificities. Reasons why the equivalence of trade and 
migration may break down include: that the productivity of factors varies between countries, 
either in general or factor by factor; that not all countries can produce all goods because, for 
example, they lack a geographically specific input such as climate or, except in the very long 
run, good governance and strong institutions; that taxes and, say, labour market policies 
influence factor rewards; that  imperfect competition in goods markets distorts the link 
between the costs and prices of goods; and that economies of scale allow larger economies 
to pay higher wages.2  
It is worth noting that in the neo-classical model the effect of migration on trade is indirect, 
operating via general equilibrium. Immigration, say, increases the labour supply and sets off 
forces that tend toward reducing wages and the prices of labour intensive goods. In turn, 
the returns to producing these latter goods increases, which is accompanied by an increase 
in their supply, which fuels an increase in exports or else a reduction in imports. In fact, 
subject to certain limits, the quantity responses entirely offset the price effects, so that 
prices and wages remain at their initial levels, which is the basis of the equivalence of free 
trade and free factor mobility.  
By contrast, the second and third fundamental contributions analyse direct connections 
between migration and trade, with the former affecting the relative costs or benefits of the 
latter. The second is a series of theoretical works led by economists at Stanford University 
during the early 1990s. Milgrom et al. (1990) study the role of the Lex Mercatoria, or the 
Merchant Law enforcement system, that provided incentives for economic agents to trade 
honestly by ‘coordinating the actions of people with limited knowledge and trust’ (Benson 
1989). Avner Greif further stresses in a series of pioneering theoretical contributions, the 
trade-fostering roles of institutions in two historical contexts, specifically the Maghribi 
Traders’ Coalition in the 11th century (Greif 1989, 1993) and the merchant guild during the 
Commercial Revolution of the 11th–14th Century (Greif et al. 1994). In a nutshell, Greif’s 
work argues that myriad social and political forces at various times in history culminated in 
the formation of institutions that helped to overcome the commitment issues that would 
otherwise have undermined trade relations. They did so by disseminating information on 
                                                            
2 In addition there are some more technical factors that might cause the equivalence to break down – e.g. 
there may be more factors than goods, or technology may be such that the same goods prices are consistent 
with different factor prices (the case of so-called factor intensity reversals). 
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members’ past trading behaviour and coordinating traders’ responses in order to punish 
aberrant behaviour, both of which serve to improve compliance with commercial 
agreements. Greif explicitly distanced his work from the trade theory prevailing at the time, 
advocating the crucial role of (social) institutions in nurturing trade relationships, as 
opposed to the traditional theoretical drivers of international trade such as ‘endowments, 
technology, preferences and the nature of competition in international markets’ (Greif 1992: 
128). 
The third pivotal work is an outstanding piece of empirical scholarship, which laid the 
intellectual foundations for the now burgeoning literature that examines the mechanisms 
and interactions underpinning the trade-migration nexus. Gould (1994) motivates his 
seminal contribution by observing that immigrant labour is different from the domestic 
work force: receiving countries do not simply benefit from a corresponding increase in 
labour or human capital, but additionally from the immigrants’ links to their home countries. 
Gould proposes two key mechanisms via which migrants might bolster trade: an immigrant 
preference hypothesis, by which migrants increase the demand in their country of 
destination for goods produced in their country of origin, and a more important immigrant-
link hypothesis, through which migrants lower the transaction costs of trade between the 
two countries by, for example, reducing communication costs through speaking the same 
language, lowering the costs of obtaining foreign market information through their 
knowledge of home markets, and by decreasing the costs of negotiating and enforcing 
contracts by drawing upon their trusted networks at origin. The immigrant-link hypothesis 
therefore suggests that the ability of migrants to foster trade is a function of the existing 
foreign market information in the host country and ‘the ability of immigrants to relay 
information and to integrate their communities into the host country’ (Gould 1994: 303). A 
corollary of this hypothesis is that migrants should exert more effect on bilateral trade in 
environments of weaker institutions where contract enforcement is more costly, i.e. in and 
with developing countries.  
Gould argues that immigrants’ preferences necessarily operate in the same direction as 
immigration, therefore fostering imports, while the immigrant-link effect can affect 
transaction costs for both imports and exports. He estimates separate regressions for 
exports and imports: 
Equation 1a (exports)  𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑗𝑖 + 𝜗′𝑍𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
Equation 1b (imports)  𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑗𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝜌𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑗𝑖 + 𝜑′𝑍𝑖𝑗 + 𝜈𝑖𝑗 
Where lnXij and lnXji are the natural logarithms of respectively exports from i to j and 
exports from country j to i, i.e. i’s imports from j, lnMigji and lnMigij are the natural 
logarithms of the bilateral migrant stock from j to i and from i to j and ϑ and φ are vectors of 
coefficients for all remaining controls. For identification purposes, Gould compares the 
elasticities of imports and exports with respect to immigration, arguing that if immigrants 
affect only imports (ρ>0 and β=0) then the preference channel is the more relevant, while if 
they affect only exports (β>0 and ρ=0)  the immigrant-link hypothesis is most likely 
connection. Estimating a gravity model for the United States and 47 of her trading partners, 
Gould finds that both elasticities are strongly positive, from which he argues that both 
mechanisms are relevant. His inference is not entirely secure, however, because it is quite 
possible that the immigrant-link channel alone may account for this result.  
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Gould further examines various immigrant characteristics, namely their education levels and 
their duration of stay and also the size of the immigrant community. These features, which 
according to the immigrant-link hypothesis should affect the degree to which immigrants 
foster trade, do not appear again in the literature for many years to follow. Interestingly in 
terms of skill level, Gould shows that, except in the equation for producer imports, the 
estimated parameter of the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers is always negative. He 
argues that this reflects offsetting forces: all immigrants lower transactions costs through 
their foreign market information but educated ones are also more likely to create industries 
that are substitutes for traded goods; the positive effect on producer goods could arise if 
the educated migrants’ firms use producer goods from their home nations. Gould estimates 
that the ‘immigrant information effect’ changes with the size of the immigrant community, 
finding that around 12,000 immigrants are sufficient to exhaust 90 per cent of the effect for 
aggregate exports flows, while the corresponding figure for imports is around 371,000. 
Finally, Gould’s model includes terms for the duration of immigrants’ stay and its square; 
the estimates suggest that for imports the immigrant effects increase bilateral trade at a 
decreasing rate over time – which might demonstrate the waning of preferences for goods 
produced in the home country – while for exports they start low and increase after about 
four years. This latter finding is consistent with the idea that immigrants need time to 
assimilate into the destination country in order to best use their foreign market information.  
Aside from representing the first empirical paper in the literature, Gould’s work 
distinguishes itself in a number of important respects. First, by distinguishing two main 
hypotheses he recognised that immigrant preferences might play an important role in 
fostering bilateral trade. Second, in contrast to many of the subsequent (and less convincing) 
papers that adopt rather ad-hoc specifications, Gould builds on what was, at its time, widely 
viewed as the most sophisticated theoretical specification for aggregate trade equations: he 
extended the gravity model proposed by Bergstrand (1985) by modelling inter-country 
transaction costs such that they could decline via the foreign market information brought by 
immigrants. Third, Gould’s empirical specification is very rich in terms of explanatory 
variables, which in turn allows him to investigate the immigrant-link hypothesis in a far 
more nuanced way – for example, the ways in which the information effect varies according 
to the characteristics of the immigrant population. Fourth, in distinguishing consumer and 
producer imports and exports, Gould also provided the conceptual framework for 
subsequent theoretical models (see below); in doing so he recognised that different types of 
goods may embody different characteristics that reflect the differing extents to which prices 
convey the full set of information necessary for commercial transactions.  
Aside from Gould’s study being a time-series analysis, which militates against easily 
comparing his results with those of other studies, its principal shortcomings pertain mostly 
to its identification strategies. Perhaps most obviously, Gould fails to include time dummies, 
so that macro trends that might be driving both trade and migration are not captured in the 
model. Other failings of this ilk include an inability to prove that migrant preferences 
supplement the immigrant-link’ connection (because the latter can explain the positive 
effects on both exports and imports), a failure to establish formally that causality runs from 
migration to trade and finally, as Gould himself recognises, that his specification might 
evoke omitted variable bias since ‘another variable suggested by the analytical model but 
not included in the estimating equations here is the number of immigrants from the United 
States in the home countries’ (Gould 1994: 309). It is no exaggeration that these 
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shortcomings have to a large extent motivated many of the subsequent papers in the 
literature.  
The Subsequent Literature 
The theoretical and empirical literatures were subsequently advanced by James Rauch, 
whose name today is often associated with the ‘network/search view of trade.’3 Relaxing 
the assumption in models of differentiated goods under monopolistic competition that 
buyers and sellers are automatically matched by some perfectly operating international 
market, Rauch (1996, 1999) argues that the heterogeneity in traded manufactures along 
‘the dimensions of both characteristics and quality’ (Rauch 1996: 1) means that prices no 
longer offer sufficient information to allow them to be sold on international organised 
exchanges. Rather, according to his partial equilibrium theory, buyers and sellers are 
matched through a costly search process that is both a function of the proximity of buyers 
and sellers and, crucially, of ‘pre-existing ties’.  
Drawing upon the terminology from one of the most cited sociological works in history, ‘The 
Strength of Weak Ties’ (Granovetter 1973), Rauch argues that more distant and weaker ties 
(e.g. older ties or ties that involve less frequent social interactions), might actually be 
strongest in terms of yielding the ‘best’ outcome – in our case, greater volumes of trade – 
because there will be less overlap between the information that they know and that which 
you possess. Thus the exchange of differentiated goods is fostered by international 
networks as opposed to traditional markets, which is all the more important given that the 
majority of world trade comprises differentiated goods (Rauch 1999). Rauch’s key insight 
therefore follows directly from Gould (1994) who noted that ‘because producer goods tend 
to be the least differentiated product (for instance, scrap metal) across countries, trade 
flows in these products may not benefit much from country-specific trade information’ 
(Gould 1994: 310). Rauch and Casella (2003) extend the analysis to a more formal general 
equilibrium matching model, in which group-ties extend complete information about their 
domestic markets across international borders within groups, thereby fostering a more 
efficient international matching of pairs of producers.  
Despite his earlier pessimism that ‘it is doubtful that studies using data on bilateral trade 
flows such as Gould (1994) can be anything more than suggestive’ (Rauch 1996: 19), Rauch 
(1999), tests his theoretical conjecture by including in a gravity model of bilateral trade, a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a trading dyad shares either a language or a 
colonial link. Since the coefficient on this variable is smaller for homogenous than for 
differentiated goods, Rauch provides indirect support for the theory even in the absence of 
bilateral migration data. Rauch and Trindade (2002) go further, and while abstracting from 
the preference channel, use bilateral data on Chinese ethnic networks to dig deeper into the 
immigrant-link hypothesis by distinguishing between the (foreign) market information effect 
and the trust and enforceability of contracts channel. Their key tool for identification is 
Rauch’s (1999) classification of goods. Rauch distinguishes (i) homogenous goods which 
comprise commodities that are sold on organised exchanges and thus can be traded 
efficiently because their prices are kept up-to-date such that traders can arbitrage between 
opportunities in the absence of additional information, (ii) reference goods, which are priced 
                                                            
3 Gould mentioned ‘networks’ but once in his paper, while Rauch uses the term 18 times in Rauch (1996) and 
17 times in Rauch (1999). 
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without mention of a brand but not sold on organised exchanges, and (iii) differentiated 
goods, the prices for which fail to transmit full information relevant to international 
commerce. It is the latter in which co-ethnic networks can use their intra-network foreign 
market information to match buyers and sellers. Rauch and Trindade’s identification 
strategy hinges upon the supposition that the contract re-enforcement mechanism should 
equally apply across all types of goods, while the foreign market information channel should 
only apply to differentiated goods; thus while the effect of Chinese ethnic networks on 
homogenous goods can be taken as a ‘baseline’ impact through the mechanism of contract 
enforcement, the difference in the trade creating effects between differentiated and 
homogenous goods can be taken as a measure of the market information channel. The 
authors’ central hypothesis is borne out: ethnic Chinese networks do affect trade in all types 
of goods but are found to exert additional effects on flows of differentiated products. 
Building upon Gould’s previous finding, Rauch and Trindade also find diminishing marginal 
returns to potential network size.  
At the core of the theories of Greif, Gould and Rauch, therefore, is the crucial role of social 
capital that operates through the twin mechanisms of diffusing information and maintaining 
trust. A key difference however, is that while Greif places more emphasis on networks 
providing information on agents’ past behaviour, Gould and Rauch, instead, emphasise 
immigrant-links and migrant networks providing information in the form of foreign market 
knowledge (to surmount issues of incomplete information).4 The great contribution of 
Rauch’s work is in providing a formal, tractable and ahistorical model, which includes the 
salient features of the models of both Greif and Gould that can be applied relatively easily to 
the data in a variety of alternative contexts. In doing so, the role of migrant networks has 
been brought closer to the vanguard of the economics literature. In addition to the 
network/search theory of trade being able to provide a cogent explanation for the fact that 
bilateral distances do not exert a more negative impact upon the volume of trade as 
transportation costs increase as a percentage of value,5 the failure of networks to eliminate 
informal trade barriers entirely is a leading contender to explain the puzzle of the missing 
trade (Trefler 1995; Rauch and Trindade 2002). 
The literature to date focuses mainly on immigrants hosted by developed countries. This 
choice has largely been governed by the availability of trade and migration data and, in turn, 
the increasing complexity of studies generally reflects the gradual availability of richer data. 
What is perhaps most remarkable about the literature is the consistency with which a 
positive relationship between migration and trade has been found, albeit with a wide 
variation in magnitude, which presumably reflects differences in empirical specification. 
Genc et al. (2011), for example, in their meta-analysis of 45 immigrant-link studies, find that 
on average a 10 per cent rise in immigration is associated with a 1.5 per cent rise in bilateral 
trade, and that generally the elasticity on imports is greater than that on exports, as would 
be expected given that preferences additionally operate in this direction. The majority of 
the trade-migration literature, however, provides evidence of a strong correlation between 
the two facets of globalisation. The remainder of the paper seeks to guide the reader 
                                                            
4 Felbermayr et al. (2012) build on this interpretation by distinguishing networks further militating against 
asymmetric information. 
5 Rauch’s solution based on his model of differentiated goods is that low transportation cost goods are traded 
through networks while conversely, high transportation cost commodities are sold on international organised 
exchanges in which case product homogeneity results in correct price signals being transmitted. 
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through the highlights and the main threads of the recent literature, and in doing so, we 
maintain the same focus as the majority of the literature – viz. trying to identify the causal 
transmission mechanisms at play.  
The ever-expanding literature examines the trade-migration nexus in a variety of 
geographical settings (see Table 1). The most frequent contributions study single countries 
and multiple trading partners, in for example:  Australia (White and Tadesse (2007), Canada 
(Head and Ries 1998), Denmark (White 2007a), France (Briant et al. 2013), Greece (Piperakis 
et al. 2003), New Zealand (Law et al. 2013), Spain (Blanes 2008), Sweden (Hatzigeorgiou 
2010), Switzerland (Vézina 2012), the United States (Dunlevy and Hutchinson 1999, 2001; 
White 2007b; White and Tadesse 2008, 2010), and the United Kingdom (Girma and Yu 2002). 
Another strand of the literature instead draws on data for national sub-divisions: American 
states (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2008; Bardhan and Guhathakurta 2004; Co et al. 2004; 
Coughlin and Wall 2011; Dunlevy 2006; Herander and Saavedra 2005; White and Tadesse 
2007), Canadian provinces (Wagner, Head and Ries 2002), Italian NUTS-3 regions (Bratti et al. 
2014), Spanish provinces (Peri and Requena 2010), or Italian, Portuguese and Spanish sub-
regions (Artal-Tur et al. 2012). Yet another thread examines either groups of countries in a 
cross-sectional setting (Felbermayr et al. 2010; Felbermayr and Toubal 2012; Hatzigeorgiou 
2010; Muller and Tai 2012; Aleksynska and Peri 2013), or groups of countries in a panel 
setting (Felbermayr and Toubal 2012; Sangita 2013). Still others study the links between 
internal migration and trade, either in France (Combes et al. 2005) or the United States 
(Millimet and Osang 2007).  
 
Table: Methodological Overview of Immigrant-Link Literature6 
Paper Time Period Data Structure Estimator Standard Errors Geographic/Time Fixed Effect 
Sets 
Gould (1994) 1970-1986 USA + 47 national trading 
partners 
Times Series (non-linear least 
squares) 
Unspecified Partner Country 
Head and Ries (1998) 1980-1992 Canada + 136 national trading 
partners 
Tobit (Eaton-Tamura method) Unspecified Region, Year  
Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999, 
2001) 
1870-1910 (5 year 
intervals) 
USA + 17 national trading 
partners 
Scaled OLS  Unspecified/ 
Robust 
None 
Girma and Yu (2002) 1981-1993 UK + 48 national trading 
partners 
OLS Robust Year, (robustness with partner-
time dummies) 
Rauch and Trindade (2002) 1980, 1990 63 nations Tobit (Eaton-Tamura method) Robust None 
Wagner et al (2002) 1992-1995 5 Canadian regions + 160 
national trading partners 
Heckman Selection model Robust Partner Country 
Piperakis et al (2003) 1981-1991 Greece + unspecified number 
of national trading partners 
OLS Robust Year  
Bardhan and Guhathakurta 
(2004) 
1994-1996 2 US coastal regions + 51 
national trading partners 
OLS Robust Year  
Co et al (2004) 1993 USA states + 28 national 
trading partners 
Scaled OLS, Tobit Robust None 
Combes et al (2005) 1993 95 French Departments OLS, (2SLS), also odds and 
‘frictions’ specifications  
Robust Department (Importer and 
exporter) 
Herander and Saavedra (2005) 1993-1996 US States + 36 national trading 
partners 
Tobit (Eaton-Tamura method), 
censored least absolute 
deviation estimator 
Unspecified Region 
Dunlevy (2006) 1990-1992 
(averaged i.e. 
cross-section) 
US States + 87 national trading 
partners 
Tobit Unspecified State, Partner Country  
Tadesse and White (2007) 2000 USA + 75 national trading 
partners 
Tobit (Eaton-Tamura method) Unspecified None 
White (2007a) 1980-2000 Denmark + 170 national trading Tobit Robust Year  
                                                            
6 The papers comprising this table include those that the authors consider to belong to the core of the immigrant-link literature. Only sets 
of fixed-effects are recorded in, in other words should a dummy variable be included for example for a single specific region this will not 




White (2007b) 1980-2001 USA + 73 national trading 
partners 
OLS Robust Year 
White and Tadesse (2007) 1989-2000 Australia + 101 national trading 
partners 
Iterative Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares, Tobit, Pooled 
Corrected Standard Error 
Unspecified None 
Blanes (2008) 1995-2003 Spain + 83 national trading 
partners 
OLS Robust Year  
Bandyopadhyay et al (2008) 1990 and 2000 US States + 29 national trading 
partners 
OLS, Panel FE Unspecified Year, State, Partner Country, 
State-Country  
White & Tadesse (2008) 1997-2004 USA + 54 national trading 
partners 
Random Effects Feasible 
Generalised Least Squares 
Robust Year  
Felbermayr and Jung (2009) 1990, 2000 OECD + all national trading 
partners 
OLS, first-difference estimator  Robust Importer-Year, Exporter Year  
Felbermayr et al (2010) 1980, 1990 & 2000 World OLS, PPML-DV Cluster Robust Importer, Exporter  
Hatzigeorgiou (2010a) 2000 75 nation states OLS, PPML Cluster Robust Importer, Exporter 
Hatzigeorgiou (2010b) 2002-2007 Sweden + 180 national trading 
partners 
OLS, Panel, Tobit Robust Year, Region  
Peri and Requena (2010) 1993-2008 50 Spanish provinces + 77 
national trading partners 
OLS,  Panel IV, 2SLS, Scaled 
OLS, PPML, Tobit 
Cluster Robust Province-Year, Country-Year, 
Province-Country  
White and Tadesse (2010) 1996-2001 USA + 59 national trading 
partners 
Random Effects Generalized 
Least Squares 
Unspecified Year  
Artal-Tur et al (2012) 2002-2010 103 Italian & 50 Spanish 
provinces and 20 Portuguese 
districts 
OLS  Cluster Robust Province-Country, Country-Year 
Felbermayr and Toubal (2012) 2000 OECD + all national trading 
partners 
OLS Robust Importer, Exporter 
Muller and Tai (2012) 2000 19  OECD countries + all 
potential worldwide national 
trading partners 
Scaled OLS Cluster Robust Importer-Sector, Exporter-
Sector, Importer-Exporter  
Vezina (2012) Average 1995-2009 Switzerland + 174 trading 
partners 
OLS, 2SLS, PPML, Poisson-IV, 
Negative binomial, Poisson-FE 
Robust/Clustered Trading Partner (Poisson-FE 
model) 
Aleksynska and Peri (2013) 2000 89 destinations +  233 origins Scaled  OLS, PPML, Tobit Cluster Robust Importer, Exporter, (Year  for 
exact year of data collection) 
Briant et al (2013) Average 1998-2000 94 French Departments + 100 
national trading partners 
OLS, 2-step negative binomial 
model, 2SLS 
Robust Department, Partner Country 
Law et al (2013) 1981-2006 New Zealand + 190 national 
trading partners 
Heckman Selection model with 
Correlated Random Effects  
Unspecified Year, Partner country 
Sangita (2013) 1990, 2000 OECD + 200 national trading 
partners 
OLS, 2SLS Unspecified Importer, Exporter 
Bratti et al (2014) 2002-2009 20 Italian regions/107 Italian 
Provinces + 210 national 
trading partners 





The gravity model is the work-horse of trade-migration research and this sub-section 
discusses some of the issues surrounding its specification. The most common objective in 
the literature is to distinguish ever more carefully between Gould’s two effects, specifically 
to attempt to separate the transaction cost mechanism, which is unambiguously welfare 
improving, from the preference channel, otherwise termed Nostalgia Trade (Vézina 2012), 
Transplanted Home Bias (White 2007b), or the taste channel (Sangita 2013). Initial 
contributions typically used aggregate trade and migration data, regressing both imports 
and exports on the bilateral stocks of immigrants (see Equations 1a and 1b), relying on the 
identification strategy that the preference channel operates solely on imports while the 
information channel operates instead on both imports and exports.  
As highlighted by Hatzigeorgiou (2010), however, a more satisfactory approach involves 
regressing one-way trade on both immigrant and emigrant stocks, viz. 
Equation 2:   𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑗𝑖 +  𝜌𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝜗′𝑍𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
This is because, as first elucidated by Ravenstein (1885), migrant flows often lead to migrant 
counter flows. Should this be the case, immigrant and emigrant stocks will be positively 
correlated and, as recognised by Gould (see quote above) and demonstrated by the 
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empirical results of Combes et al. (2005), a failure to include both immigrant and emigrant 
stocks will result in upwardly biased coefficient estimates on the former. Second, since the 
emphasis of the literature is in trying to isolate the immigrant-link hypothesis, the 
‘transaction channel’ can be better identified should a flow of migrants against the direction 
of trade be found to foster that trade flow, since it is impossible for preferences to operate 
in that direction. In other words, if in equation (2), β>0 i.e. if immigrants from country j 
living in country i foster exports from i to j, this effect must manifest through the transaction 
cost channel. Isolating this effect is only possible if one controls for migration in both 
directions, however, since both immigrants and emigrants may establish both importing and 
exporting businesses.  
While the complexities of the empirical models used in the migration literature mirror the 
advances made in the wider econometric literature, the control variables it uses are fairly 
standard, including the usual suspects such as measures of economic mass, distance, 
colonial ties, common language and regional trade agreements. Typically trade and 
migration enter these specifications in (log) levels, although, in order to try to reduce scale 
effects, a handful of papers implement either or both in terms of shares (e.g. Rauch and 
Trindade 2002, Felbermayr et al. 2010, Felbermayr and Toubal 2012). 
The specification of the gravity model has evolved significantly since the ad-hoc 
specifications of the early literature, in which additional covariates of interest were added 
somewhat haphazardly into the estimated regression in the absence of more formal 
theoretical justifications. Gould is a notable exception since he extended the gravity model 
of Bergstrand (1985) by endogenising transaction costs with respect to the foreign market 
information provided by immigrants. In an important development, the representative 
consumer’s utility function is defined over differentiated varieties Combes et al. (2005). A 
weight is attached to all varieties imported from region j, which denotes the preferences 
that i consumers have for j varieties, i.e. a bilateral affinity term is used to weight the 
importance attached by representative consumers in country i to country j’s products, 
which explicitly allows preferences to be included in the derivation of the model. Peri and 
Requena (2010) instead rely upon the distorted gravity model of Chaney (2008) to examine 
how immigrants affect the intensive and extensive margins of trade. Finally, Sangita (2013) 
introduces a simple extension to the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) gravity model, by 
explicitly splitting their ‘trade frictions’ into ‘knowledge gaps’, that migrants are purported 
to surmount, and transportation costs.  
This increasing complexity has been accompanied by evermore stringent specifications in 
terms of the number of controls, or more precisely the large number of fixed effects applied 
(in order to militate against omitted variable bias). But there is still no consensus on a 
number of econometric issues. The first is how best to deal with the large number of zeroes 
in bilateral trade data. The three most common approaches that feature in many of the 
earlier contributions in the literature are: (1) to use a Tobit model, setting the censoring 
threshold to zero; (2) to add a small value, typically one, to all cells before taking the log and 
proceeding with OLS; or (3) to simply drop zero observations and use OLS, which necessarily 
results in selection bias, which Rauch (1999) shows has significant effects on results. More 
recently, in a highly influential piece of work, Santos Silva and Tenreryo (2006) argue that a 




One empirical issue that should be in no doubt, however, is in terms of clustering standard 
errors by the relevant observational unit (as opposed to simply using robust standard 
errors), because observations of bilateral trade across partners will generally not be 
independently distributed. Unfortunately, studies correctly clustering standard errors are 
still in the minority (see table above). The preceding arguments, namely: the increasingly 
stringent empirical specifications, the inclusion or exclusion of zeroes, the variety of 
estimators used and the fact that relatively few papers in the literature cluster standard 
errors correctly, mean that any comparisons of the point estimates from across the various 
studies remain somewhat confounded. 
Identification – Product Types 
The trade and migration literature seeks to address the extent to which a causal link can 
truly be established from migration to trade. To this end, papers typically aim to both (a) 
isolate the transaction cost mechanism by drawing upon richer more disaggregated data 
and (b) insulate their results from both omitted variable bias and reverse causality that 
might otherwise confound their results.  
Perhaps the most common method to isolate the transaction cost mechanism is to examine 
the pro-trade effect on different classifications of goods, since theory suggests that migrants 
should exert the greatest pro-trade effect on those most differentiated. While Gould 
examines consumer and producer goods (as do Herander and Saavedra 2005 and Blanes 
2008), most authors instead follow Rauch’s (1999) classification of goods (for example: 
Briant et al. 2013; Hatzigeorgiou 2010; Vézina 2012; Sangita 2013). Similarly, Peri and 
Requena (2010) and Aleksynska and Peri (2014) apply the estimated elasticities from Broda 
and Weinstein (2006) to categorise the degree of product differentiation in various sectors. 
Other authors simply use manufactured goods, which are often considered to be the most 
differentiated type of goods (for example Dunlevy 2006), or else simply delineate between 
manufactures and non-manufactures (for example White and Tadesse 2010). Dunlevy and 
Hutchinson (1999, 2001), in their historical studies of the United States, instead distinguish 
between five product categories: crude foodstuffs, crude materials, processed foodstuffs, 
semi-manufactures, and manufactures for consumption.   
Most studies find that immigrants exert a stronger effect on differentiated as opposed to 
homogenous goods, although exceptions exist. White (2007a), for example, fails to find the 
usual effect. This might be because he fails to include a full set of controls (i.e. fixed effects) 
to account for omitted variable bias. Similarly, Felbermayr et al. (2010) do not find that 
immigrants generally matter more for differentiated products, but this does not worry them 
because it is ‘not overly surprising since the theory-based gravity model signals that the 
estimated coefficients confound the elasticity of substitution with the trade cost elasticity of 
networks, so that comparing across categories of goods is not an ideal identification 
strategy’ (Felbermayr et al. 2010: 63). A further weakness in drawing upon the now 
standard Rauch classification, is that it has not changed over time and thus while we might 
expect that concurrent with rapidly expanding global trade would be an increase in the 
numbers and types of differentiated goods, authors typically estimate regressions with a 
fixed definition of what constitutes a differentiated good. Sangita (2013) takes a different 
tack, separating intermediate from final goods, arguing that the former should not be 
affected by any preference effects. Since in the absence of taste effects, the pro-trade effect 
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of migration is maintained, this lends further support for the existence of the transaction 
cost channel. Interestingly, Law et al. (2013) also examine the pro-trade effect of both 
immigrants and emigrants on tourism to New Zealand and find that this effect is 
substantially higher than that for trade in goods. They are unable to establish, however, 
whether the effect on tourism is due to information about New Zealand being transmitted 
from the diaspora to others around the world or whether it is due to increased numbers of 
visits by family and friends.  
Identification – Geographical Proximity 
In other contexts, authors have exploited geography to isolate the causal impact of 
migration on trade. Since search costs and thus the social interactions that are purported to 
govern the trade-migration nexus will probably depend on proximity (Rauch 1999), 
Herander and Saavedra (2005) suggest that geographic distance within the United States 
between host-country agents and immigrants is crucial in terms of communicating host-
country exporting opportunities. Bratti et al. (2014), thus, argue that the proper 
geographical unit from which to assess the existence of interactions and knowledge flows 
between natives and immigrants are small areas. Bratti et al. (2014) represent a great 
advance in the literature in this regard by using provincial data (i.e. NUTS-3  regions) on 107 
Italian provinces with an average area of 2,800 square kilometres, which additionally allow 
for the imposition of a full battery of fixed effects to further isolate their results from 
omitted variable bias. Herander and Saavedra (2005) specifically highlight the role of 
geography as a key component of network structure, since they find that while in-state 
migrant populations exert the greatest state pro-export effect, out-of-state populations also 
foster such links. Conceptually, this avenue of research is similar to the work of Felbermayr 
et al. (2010), who document the fact that, having controlled for the general openness of 
states through the imposition of country fixed effects, those migrants born in neither the 
importing nor the exporting country can still foster international trade links. These they call 
indirect links, the presence of which, importantly, cannot be due to preference effects. 
Artal-Tur et al. (2012) perhaps go furthest in this regard however, since they combine 
regional trade and migration data for Italy, Portugal and Spain. The results from these 
authors’ most stringent specification highlight the importance of the role of geography since 
they find (for all three countries in their sample) that only immigrants within a trading 
province – as opposed to those from the same country residing in other parts of the 
Southern European countries – exert a pro-trade impact. This constitutes evidence against 
Herander and Saavedra (2005), but it is not clear if these results are robust to the inclusion 
of province-year fixed effects. 
Identification – Firms 
Combes et al. (2005) importantly distinguish between migrant networks (measured by intra-
region worker stocks) and networks of firms (measured as the number of potential business 
connections of various business groups across regions), thus separating out the effects of 
social and business networks. They therefore introduce an additional mechanism through 
which networks can foster trade, i.e. through business networks overcoming informational 
asymmetries via FDI. Compared to a situation of no networks, social networks are found to 
double trade while business networks are estimated to boost trade by a factor of up to four. 
Related is the paper of Bardhan and Guhathakurta (2004), who similarly delineate between 
international socio-cultural networks (measured as the numbers of foreign born) and 
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business networks (measured as the proportion of multinational exports or intra-firm 
exports as a fraction of total exports), and examine the impact of each on East and West 
Coast US exports to 53 nations worldwide. They find that business ties are important for 
both coasts but that social networks are only relevant for the West coast. No convincing 
explanation is offered for this, although the authors rather argue somewhat loosely that the 
industrial and immigrant structures of the two coasts differ. It seems likely that the ad-hoc 
gravity specification adopted in tandem with the fact that only 53 countries of origin are 
included in estimation might be driving these findings. Relatedly, Greaney (2005) examines 
network effects by comparing the trading patterns of foreign affiliates in the United States 
with those of domestic firms. Foreign affiliates are found to exert an unbelievably strong 
home bias; in particular, Japanese affiliates are found to trade over 130 times more with 
Japan than elsewhere. Interestingly, affiliates are found to trade less with countries located 
further from their home countries, even when controlling for the distance between an 
affiliate and the destination country, which implies the existence of regional networks (and 
potentially cultural connections), one based neither on trade costs nor on information. If the 
geographical patterns of FDI and migration are positively correlated (and presumably they 
are via country size as well as cultural and historical links), these results raise the possibility 
that studies which do not include FDI will give upwardly biased estimates of the pro-trade 
effects of migration.  
These results naturally lead one to conjecture that migrants might exert the greatest effects 
on trade if they are employed by firms, although firms no doubt have access to alternative 
resources that would allow them trade in the absence of foreign workers. This proposition is 
examined by Hiller (2013), who focuses upon manufacturing firms that export to at least 
one destination, i.e. she does not consider firms that switch into becoming exporters. By 
matching employer and employee data at the firm level, Hiller documents how Danish firms 
adjust their product portfolios in response to both regional immigration and foreign 
employment. She finds strong evidence that foreign employees foster Danish exports, but 
only weak evidence that the local presence of foreigners increases export sales. The 
introduction of firm-level data potentially introduces an additional source of endogeneity, 
however, since it is not clear whether firms export to a particular country because they have 
hired migrants or vice-versa. Hiller (2013) tries to insulate her results from such reverse 
causality by introducing instruments into her regressions, namely the average number of 
immigrants from a given origin employed in other firms in the same industry or else the 
number of foreigners from country j who work elsewhere in the region of firm i. What 
remains unclear, however, is the extent to which foreigners working locally or in the sector 
are correlated with the ‘local presence of foreigners’, which she has already identified as 
having a (weak) positive effect, for example through employees migrating with their family 
that work outside of the firm. Hiller assumes that regional immigrant stocks are exogenous 
to the firm, but given the preceding argument this assumption may be invalid.     
Muller and Tai (2012) instead match migrants by occupation to trade data across 18 
manufacturing sectors, and employ a sectoral gravity model to try to pin down the causal 
impact of immigrants on bilateral trade. Since their results are robust to stringent 
specifications saturated with fixed effects, they provide further evidence that immigrants 
foster international bilateral trade flows through the transaction cost channel, but have no 
riposte to charges of reverse causality. Bastos and Silva (2012) match ‘historically 
determined’ emigration stocks from Portugal with Portuguese firm level export data, and 
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find that larger stocks of Portuguese emigrants increase both the export participation and 
export intensity of Portuguese firms and furthermore that export participation is most 
associated with those firms that existed prior to the emigration occurring. In other words, 
Portuguese emigrants affect both the extensive and the intensive margins of trade. These 
authors argue that emigration from Portugal stemmed largely from a mass movement in the 
1960s during the Estado Novo regime that governed from 1933 to 1974. This implies that a 
large fraction of the stock in the year 2000 would comprise these older emigrants, which in 
turn would insulate their results from concerns of reverse causality. It is unknown to what 
extent Portuguese emigrant stocks in 2000 do reflect the exodus from decades beforehand, 
however, and so plausibly for any country that has received a fairly large number of 
Portuguese emigrants in recent years, the author’s conjecture seems unlikely to hold.  
Several authors have examined the effect of immigrants on the margins of trade.  Peri and 
Requena (2010) base their immigrant-link study using Spanish data on the distorted gravity 
model of Chaney (2008), which provides a theoretical foundation for examining how 
immigrants affect the margins of trade. According to the model, migrants lower the fixed 
costs of exporting such that less productive firms (those previously below the productivity 
threshold necessary to export) are now able to enter the export market. Using the number 
of transactions and the average value per transactions as proxies for the external and 
internal margins of trade, they find corroborative evidence for the underlying theory, since 
the largest part of trade creation is through the extensive margin with little to no effect on 
the intensive margin. This result seems to be in contrast with Bastos and Silva’s (2012), but 
in the latter case, since they use data on emigrants, it is possible that emigrants foster the 
intensive margin through the preference channel. Similarly, Hiller (2013), defining the 
extensive margin as ‘net churning’ (Iacovone and Javorcik 2010), i.e. the difference between 
products created and destroyed within a firm, concludes that firms increase export sales 
through the extensive margin. Vézina (2012) reports the same finding in the context of 
Switzerland.  
Identification – Migrant Characteristics 
While detailed firm and trade level data allow for a closer identification of immigrant-links, 
the majority of the literature relies on more aggregate data and typically examines migrants’ 
occupation and education levels in order to ascertain which migrants underpin the trade-
migration nexus. Highly skilled migrants and those in particular (business orientated) 
occupations might well have access to greater amounts of foreign market information and 
thus be better placed to transmit and use that knowledge. As noted by Gould (1994) 
however, skilled individuals are also more likely to be able to establish businesses in the 
destination country to produce what might otherwise have been imported, and so the net 
effect of more highly skilled migrants on bilateral trade is unclear a priori. Since highly 
skilled migrants are often defined by their level of education, it also matters where migrants 
were educated. For example, if they have received their education in the receiving country 
they will tend to assimilate faster but have fewer home ties than other migrants. Given 
these opposing forces and the level of aggregation of the data used to test these types of 
linkages, it is perhaps not surprising that the results are mixed. 
Blanes (2008) concludes that only immigrants who have secondary education affect trade in 
the case of Spain, although his empirical specification is not as tight as other work, say on 
the role of education, in terms of avoiding omitted variable bias. Felbermayr and Jung (2009) 
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find that those with primary and tertiary levels of education foster North-South trade links 
more strongly than those with secondary education. Sangita (2013), using the same 
migration data, finds that the impact of immigrants on trade is monotonically increasing in 
migrants’ education level, however. Similarly, Felbermayr and Jung (2012) find in a cross-
section of OECD countries in 2000 that the pro-trade effect of high-skilled migrants is more 
than double that of the overall effect of migrants. Finally, Muller and Tai (2012) find that 
while immigrants of all education levels affect trade, those with tertiary education have 
roughly twice the effect of others.  
Head and Ries (1998) find that immigrants who entered Canada under the ‘Family’ and 
‘Independent’ visa classes, exert the greatest pro-trade effect, while refugees have a 
negligible effect on trade. Interestingly, Head and Ries find that those entering Canada as 
‘Business Visitors’ have no impact on trade, which they conclude might be due to their 
wishing to create businesses that cater to the Canadian market. Similarly, White and 
Tadesse (2010) find for the United States that refugees have a considerably smaller pro-
trade effect than immigrants entering the labour market or those who migrated for 
purposes of family reunification. This, they quite sensibly argue, is due to the fact that 
refugees have spent considerable amounts of time in a third-party country, which might 
have eroded their links to the home country in addition to altering their preferences. 
Parsons and Vézina (2014), on the other hand, find a significant long-term impact of 
refugees residing in the United States on US bilateral trade with Vietnam, in the case of the 
Vietnamese Boat People. It does seem likely that trading links will be lower for countries 
that are generating refugees than for other countries, but the evidence of Parsons and 
Vézina (2014) suggests that if the status of such countries changes over time, the original 
refugee status may matter little in terms of long-run pro-trade effects.  
Herander and Saavedra (2005), in their study of US States, define their ratio of skilled 
migrants as the number employed in the Labor Department’s occupations 1-4 divided by 
those in categories 5-9. They consistently find that skilled workers strongly influence 
consumer-good exports (as opposed to total exports). Blanes (2008), in the case of Spain, 
finds that immigrants who are ‘Managers’ foster both Spanish imports and exports, while 
employees are not found to exert any effect, albeit using an extremely simplified 
econometric specification. Similarly, Aleksynska and Peri (2013), while focusing upon 
immigrants employed in the OECD in managerial positions, find that the pro-trade effect of 
these migrants is ten times larger than that of non-business network migrants. Moreover, 
when combined with migrants’ education levels, they find that, above-and-beyond the 
effect of the total migrant stock, only the highly educated in management positions 
underpin the trade-migration nexus.  
Mechanisms Governing the Trade-Migration Nexus 
While the literature surveyed until now goes some way to elucidating which immigrants 
underpin the trade-migration nexus, and how, in this section we delve deeper into the 
underlying mechanisms thorough which migrants facilitate trade. To this end, the literature, 
drawing upon Gould’s and Rauch’s insights typically adopts indirect approaches in order to 
ascertain the underlying mechanisms by which migrants might reduce transaction costs.  
An interesting starting point is Girma and Yu (2002), who distinguish between the individual 
effects of migrants (i.e. personal contacts) and non-individual effects (knowledge, for 
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example, of home institutions that are not individual-specific but rather assumed known by 
the population). By interacting a commonwealth dummy with the immigrant stock variable, 
these authors find that, while the UK trades more with countries of the Commonwealth, 
immigrants exert no influence of exports to these countries, but that a 10 per cent rise in 
immigration from non-Commonwealth countries is associated with 1.6 per cent rise in UK 
exports. Since the countries of the Commonwealth, which include the UK, share similar laws 
and institutions, the authors conclude that non-individual effects are the ones that drive the 
trade-migration nexus. Similarly, Blanes (2008), in the case of Spain, interacts a colonial 
dummy with the immigrant stock variable and finds that migrants from both former 
colonies and non-colonies affect trade, but that the effect is stronger for immigrants from 
non-colonies. While an important insight, the evidence of Combes et al. (2005), who find 
significant positive influences of internal migrants on internal trade, represents strong 
evidence that individual effects also play important roles, because internal migrants bring 
no incremental benefit to local non-individual knowledge. In a similar vein, Dunlevy (2006) 
finds no evidence in the case of US states that the information brought by immigrants is less 
useful when they come from a country with similar institutions, a result also found by 
Herander and Saavedra (2005).  
As we noted above, immigrants might not simply foster trade because of their knowledge of 
home market institutions, but (and perhaps more likely) might also substitute for them in 
weak institutional environments, where contract enforcement is problematic and issues of 
trust are important. Anderson and Marcoullier (2002) provide evidence that poor 
institutions located in the importer’s country significantly deter trade. Berkowitz et al. (2006) 
further show that institutions on both sides of the trading relationship play key roles in 
determining the level of trade and, furthermore, that institutions matter more for more 
complex goods since they embody characteristics that are most difficult to include in 
contracts. As opposed to studying institutional similarity (as above), therefore, many studies 
in the literature instead address the issue of how migrants may substitute for weak 
institutions. Dunlevy (2006) examines US state level trade with foreign countries, specifically 
examining the roles of information and trust. Trust is represented in these studies by 
including an interaction term between a measure of corruption and the immigrant stock, 
which is postulated to sidestep the weak institutions to provide an assured, stable and 
profitable environment for business negotiations at export destination. Dunlevy finds that 
the pro-trade effect of migrants is stronger the higher the level of corruption in the 
destination country.  
Briant et al. (2013) examine the complexity of French trade in tandem with the quality of 
institutions in partner countries. They conclude that immigrants matter for the importation 
of complex goods regardless of institutional quality at origin, while conversely, for simple 
products, immigrants affect imports only when institutions at origin are weak. On the export 
side, their results are weaker and show that immigrants affect exports only to countries with 
weak institutions (regardless of product complexity). Similarly, Muller and Tai (2012) find 
that migrants substitute for weak institutions at both origin and destination (although the 
former effect is more accurately identified) and that migrants matter more for trade when 
underdeveloped legal environments prevail. In a slightly different vein, Rotunno and Vézina 
(2012) provide evidence of a link between Chinese ethnic networks and tariff evasion. They 
argue that networks are ideally placed to engineer tariff evasion since smuggling requires 
access to market information and high levels of trust. They find strong evidence of a link 
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between Chinese networks and tariff evasion with trade both to, and from, China, an effect 
which is more severe when their host countries are most corrupt. These conclusions 
resonate with the works of Greif, Gould and Rauch and go some way to shedding further 
light on the mechanisms underlying the trade-migration nexus.  
The other key channel via which migrants are purported to facilitate trade is through the 
diffusion of foreign market information. Dunlevy (2006) proxies immigrants’ knowledge of 
market information by the use of a shared language variable, arguing that market 
information is more difficult to obtain across linguistic boundaries. Since Dunlevy finds that 
the pro-trade effect of migrants is weaker if the importing and exporting nations share a 
similar language, he takes this as evidence of the market diffusion aspect of the transaction 
cost channel, as migrant networks are likely to contribute more where the host country 
population has more difficulty obtaining information itself. Similarly, in the case of New 
Zealand, Law et al. (2013) find that non-English speaking immigrants and members of the 
New Zealand diaspora who reside in non-English speaking countries have additional pro-
trade effects on bilateral imports and exports. Wagner, Head and Ries (2002), taking 
advantage of the variation in the level of English and French spoken across Canadian 
provinces, construct a language variable that is the probability that a randomly chosen 
immigrant and a randomly chosen individual from a Canadian province are able to speak the 
same language. These authors find that speaking the same language has no statistically 
significant effect on bilateral trade, but these results are not directly comparable with those 
above, since Wagner et al. do not interact their language variable with their immigrant stock 
variable. 
These results suggest that culture plays a key role in determining global trading patterns, 
which the trade-migration literature addresses by evoking notions of cultural proximity or 
else cultural distance. A novel approach in this regard is Felbermayr and Toubal (2010), 
which uses voting patterns from the Eurovision Song Contest to construct measures of 
cultural proximity. They conclude, for the highest degree of cultural proximity, that bilateral 
trade in differentiated goods is some 16 percentage points higher, and indeed argue that 
these types of effects are above and beyond any impact of immigration. No effect is found 
for homogenous goods. It is not clear to what extent these results are driven by bilateral 
migration flows, however, since across all of the specifications in the paper these are never 
explicitly modelled. White and Tadesse (2008) construct measures of ‘cultural distance’ 
using the World Values and European Values Surveys, since home-host country dissimilarity 
may ‘engender opportunities for immigrants to exert pro-trade influences’ (White and 
Tadesse 2008: 1079). They show that, while trade is inversely related to the cultural 
distance between trading partners, migrants partially offset this effect.   
Taken as a whole, we may conclude that in general migrants exert the greatest effects on 
trade in differentiated products and immigrants have their largest effect by lowering fixed 
trade costs, i.e. through the extensive margin. Migrants of all skill levels and occupations 
may influence trade, but these effects are likely to be strongest where migrants are more 
educated, employed in a firm and, most specifically, in a managerial position. To this end, 
migrants exploit both their personal contacts and their home market information to 
transmit their knowledge across international (and national) borders, to establish trusting 
relationships, to substitute for weak institutional environments where contract 
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enforcement is more costly, and, not least, where cultural differences between trading 
partners are greatest.  
Non-Linear Effects 
Until now we have said little about how such effects change either over time or with 
changes in the extent of migration (i.e. non-linearities). Although both Gould and Rauch 
devoted space to discussing possible non-linearities in the effect of migration on trade, 
surprisingly few studies have taken this matter up. Typically constant elasticity models are 
used that do not allow for the effect of migration on trade to change, although exceptions 
exist. Two key sources of such non-linearities are migrants’ length of stay and the size of the 
immigrant community.  
Wagner et al.’s (2002) random encounter model allows for diminishing returns to 
immigration and, like Gould, suggests that the pro-trade effect of immigrants tapers off 
more quickly for exports than for imports. Peri and Requena (2010) find support for a 
convex relationship across Spanish provinces between immigrant density and their pro-
trade effect and conclude that a minimum threshold is needed for an immigrant network to 
operate. Finally, Law et al. (2013), when studying New Zealand, find diminishing returns of 
immigrants on exports but not on imports by including an immigrant quadratic term. 
Herander and Saavedra (2005) introduce a variable to capture immigrants’ length of stay 
and its square and find that immigrants increase US state exports at a decreasing rate as 
stays extend. Collectively, these results might suggest that a fairly fixed set of opportunities 
exist on the transaction cost side which are largely exhausted once a particular threshold is 
reached, but that preference effects are more persistent. Herander and Saavedra (2005) 
also test whether previous immigration reduces the role of current immigrants in facilitating 
US state exports. To this end, they interact their state level migrant stock variable with a 
measure of ancestor origin, defined as the number of US residents per state that report 
ancestors from a particular export destination. These authors find that the local state 
populations from high-ancestry countries increase bilateral exports by 1.1 per cent, as 
opposed to 1.6 per cent for those from low-ancestry countries. This indicates that, since the 
flow of information between the USA and low-ancestry countries is lower, the role of 
immigrant populations from these countries is higher.  
Jansen and Piermartini (2009) specifically examine the effects of temporary migration in the 
US on trade, using H1B visa admissions as a proxy for temporary migration, while 
additionally controlling for permanent migration as captured through the total stock of 
immigrants. They argue that while permanent migrants are likely to have better host-
country contacts, temporary migrants will tend to have more up-to-date home country 
information that can be exploited to the benefit of trade. These authors find not only that 
temporary migration has a positive and statistically significant impact on trade, above and 
beyond permanent migration, but also that the effects of temporary migration are 
significantly larger. Establishing causality in the case of temporary migration is more difficult, 
however, since firms might well aim to hire workers of particular nationalities in order to 
take advantage of specific trading opportunities. 
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Negative Effects  
While the overwhelming majority of results across all of the papers surveyed in this paper 
uncover a positive relationship between trade and migration, it is important to note that in 
a limited number of cases authors have found negative results. Dunlevy and Hutchinson 
(1999), for example, in the case of immigrants from ‘New Europe’, find a strong negative 
effect on US imports. They argue that this result might hinge on the characteristics of this 
migrant group, which arrived predominantly after 1890, typically stayed for shorter periods 
and thus had less time to establish host country contacts, and, perhaps most pertinently, 
possessed little capital with which to import native goods or indeed establish importing 
businesses. Moreover, the authors argue that some of these immigrants originated from 
small regions, such as the Azores, that might have exported little anyway. Girma and Yu 
(2002) also find a negative, trade-substituting, effect on UK imports for immigrants from 
Commonwealth countries.  
These results all occur on the import side of the trade-migration relationship, which might 
imply that such effects operate through the preference channel. One plausible explanation 
offered by Díaz (1970), however, is that immigrants might establish import-substituting 
businesses in the country of destination. It is also not inconceivable that the presence of 
large numbers of immigrants whose preferences differ from the domestic population will 
increase the incentives of local nationally-owned firms to produce substitute products. A 
second alternative from Rauch’s (2001) network/search view of trade is that 
‘…less desirable network members may choose to enter the anonymous 
international market where their characteristics are not known, harming non-
members even though the existence of a transnational network still increases world 
output in the aggregate. Second, a transnational network can have an effect 
analogous to harmful trade diversion if it links the “wrong” countries. Third, 
organization of international trade through networks may hinder its growth if 
transnational networks tend to be closed to new members’ (Rauch 2001: 1200).  
Since the overwhelming methodology of migration-trade studies is the regression model, 
which estimates average effects across origin countries and migrant characteristics we 
might conclude that negative effects exists, but that they usually dwarfed by the positive, 
pro-trade, effects of immigrants. An interesting avenue for future research, therefore, might 
be to apply richer, more disaggregated, data so as to identify exactly under which 
circumstances these negative effects arise.  
Omitted Variables and Causality 
Both trade and migration data typically suffer from measurement error. Such measurement 
issues are no doubt exacerbated among those studies that impute migration data, which 
they do often, relying on a stock-flow rule (examples include Head and Ries 1998, Piperakis 
et al. 2003, White (2007), White and Tadesse 2007, White and Tadesse 2010, Law et al. 
2013). With regards to endogeneity, however, the trade-migration literature focuses not on 
these errors but on addressing concerns about omitted variable bias and reverse causality.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed account of the received wisdom on 
the specification of the gravity model – see, for example, Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) on the 
trade aspects of the question. As mentioned above, however, and as recognised in Gould’s 
24 
 
original study, arguably the most commonly omitted variable on the migration side is the 
failure to include migrants in both directions of a bilateral link. Since these variables are 
highly positively correlated – according to Özden et al. (2011) the correlation is 0.604 for all 
decades between 1960 and 2000, but has sharply decreased  from 0.811 in 1960 to 0.334 in 
2000 – if both sets of migrants matter, the absence of one will necessarily lead to 
overestimates of the effect on trade of the other. The most notable omitted variables in the 
general gravity model literature are the various combinations of fixed effects that can be 
used to account for various unobserved heterogeneities. Wagner et al. (2002: 514) note 
‘omitted variable bias may underlie the large elasticities estimated in cross-sectional 
studies’. More broadly, the seminal contribution of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) 
highlights the need to account for multilateral resistances to trade, and as Feenstra (2004) 
notes, one convenient way of accounting for these price indices is through the imposition of 
country fixed effects (or country-time fixed effects in panel models). Their omission often 
comes at a high price. Felbermayr et al. (2010), for example, demonstrate that Rauch and 
Trindade’s original results are 2-4 times larger than they should be when one accounts for 
multilateral resistance terms. Cheng and Wall (2005) also argue for the need to include 
origin-destination fixed effects in gravity models of trade, although given that this requires 
quite long panels of data, it is only the most recent studies that can do so.  
Authors address the issue of reverse causality in a variety of ways. Gould argues that 
immigration is subject to binding quotas and occurs before the onset of trade and hence 
that reverse causality is not relevant. Felbermayr and Jung (2009) rather argue that causality 
runs from migration to trade on the basis of a regression based test for strict exogeneity 
(Wooldridge 2002: 285). Without question, however, the most widely accepted approach to 
address reverse causality is to implement instrumental variable regressions. Drawing upon 
the seminal work of Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001), Peri and Requena (2010) and 
Bratti et al. (2014) instrument changes in immigrants at the sub-national level with an 
imputed inflow of immigrants calculated by applying the net growth of immigrants at the 
national level to historical sub-regional immigrant stocks. ‘If immigrants tend to settle, at 
least initially, where other persons of the same nationality are already settled, then this 
constructed inflow of immigrants will be correlated to the actual one. On the other hand, as 
it is based on the distribution of immigrants across provinces as of 1993, the constructed 
flows are not affected by any province-specific demand shock during the considered period’ 
(Peri and Requena 2010: 1447). This approach is not free from criticism, however: Chalfin 
and Levy (2012) have argued recently that the province-specific element of the instrument 
will reflect persistent sub-regional characteristics which may affect trade behaviour other 
than via migration, and thus lead to inconsistent estimates. These authors further argue 
that the exclusion restriction will be violated if the total outflow of emigrants from a 
particular origin country was correlated with conditions in particular receiving sub-regions, 
which would be the case if such immigrants tended to cluster strongly in those provinces. 
Combes et al. (2005) rather instrument 1993 migrant stocks in France with historical 
migrant stocks from 1978.  
In an alternative approach, Vézina (2012) uses Swiss visa restrictions and migration to a 
neighbouring country (France) as instruments for Swiss immigration. Sangita (2013) 
proposes an instrument based on the variation in destination country citizenship laws, i.e. 
the number of years of residency required in order to obtain citizenship, arguing that such 
changes are exogenous to changes in trade, investment, business and political climate. 
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While all of the above can be argued to be pretty-much exogenous, it is not obvious that any 
of them pass the exclusion restriction, since unobserved cultural and historical factors might 
be confounding meaningful interpretation.  
Most recently Parsons and Vézina (2014), draw on a unique natural experiment to identify 
causality running from migration to trade – which as Felbermayr et al. (2012) notes is 
potentially the most convincing method for addressing endogeneity concerns – namely the 
exodus of the Vietnamese boat people to the United States between 1975 and 1994. These 
authors note that the large influx of Vietnamese refugees entered the US at this time during 
a complete trade embargo of Vietnam. Moreover, the first wave of refugees that entered 
the US under the auspices of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act 1975 were 
exogenously allocated across US states. Parsons and Vézina (2014) are thus able to insulate 
their results from fears of either simultaneity or endogenous location decisions of 
immigrants. After trade was opened up in 1995, Parsons and Vezina explain state-level trade 
flows by migration stocks in 1995, but are able to instrument the latter securely with the 
corresponding 1975 stocks. They find a robust positive causal link from migration and trade. 
This lends considerable credence to the positive impacts found in the majority of the 
literature, although the very particular circumstances of this case mean that one can never 
be entirely sure of its external validity, i.e. its applicability to other cases.  
Aid and Migration 
 
This section focuses attention on the literature on aid and migration, which has parallels 
with that on trade and migration: there are multiple links – in each direction, direct, indirect, 
general equilibrium – as well as exogenous third factors such as former colonial links that 
affect both. The bugbear is again establishing causality, and the focus is again almost 
entirely on one direction – in this case the extent to which aid flows affect (actually reduce) 
migration flows from recipient to donor countries. The section comprises four elements. The 
remainder of this introduction shows how widespread is the view that trade and aid might 
be used to reduce immigration to developed countries. Subsequently, we discuss the 
general equilibrium route that operates via recipient countries’ income levels. We then look 
at a number of studies that simply regress migration on aid flows before finally considering 
‘co-development’, which is an essentially European construct that attempts to put an 
intellectual and policy framework around an anti-immigration stance. 
 
The influence of international trade policy and overseas development aid on migration flows 
is an issue of some intrinsic interest, but its intellectual interest is dwarfed by its relevance 
to the policy debate over the last twenty years (and, we predict, the next twenty). 
Governments in developed countries often justify aid to developing countries, or the 
liberalisation of their import barriers, in terms of helping countries to develop – get richer – 
so that their people  will not ‘come over here.’ The following Figure from ‘The Times’ puts 





Reproduced with kind permission of Peter Brookes, The Times and NewsSyndication.com 
On aid, for example, the European Union’s High Level Working Group on Asylum and 
Migration, established in 1999, was charged with assessing ‘the effectiveness of aid and 
development strategies in the battle to limit economic migration’ (see van Selm, 2004). As 
recently as 9th October 2013, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel 
Barroso said, following the fatal sinking of a refugee boat off Lampedusa, Italy, that ‘we 
must also continue our political and development action to improve the living conditions in 
the countries of origin, working with them there, so that people do not have to flee their 
homes’.7 
At a global level, Lucas (2005) estimates a regression of aid inflows per head on net out-
migration together with a few control variables, on a sample of 77 developing countries 
over 1995-2000. He shows a significantly positive relationship. At a bilateral level, aid and 
migration are likely to be connected via a common cause – colonial or other longstanding 
links between countries (Nyberg–Sørensen et al. 2002) – but, given that there are many 
donors, this cannot explain Lucas’s aggregate relationship. Moreover, no positive 
correlation is observed between aid inflows and developing countries’ net in-migration; 
hence Lucas argues that it is highly plausible to believe that western countries’ aid to 
developing countries is indeed partly geared towards stemming migration flows.  
Similar claims are made for trade liberalisation. Schiff (1994), for example, cites Germany’s 
then Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, as declaring in 1994 that in the context of concern about 
emigration from East and Central Europe, opening the West European markets to goods 
from the East was the highest priority of EC policy towards the region. When NAFTA was 
being negotiated and seemed under threat, US Attorney General Janet Reno is reported to 
have said: ‘If NAFTA passes, my job guarding the border will be easier. If NAFTA fails, my job 
stopping the flow of illegal immigrants will become even more difficult’, and Mexican 




President Carlos Salinas that ‘we want NAFTA because we want to export goods, not 
people’.8,9 
Do Trade and Aid Influence Migration?  
The transmission mechanism implied in all these views about trade, aid and migration is 
indirect: trade liberalisation and aid are expected to affect the determinants of migration, 
most obviously incomes in developing countries, under the assumption that higher incomes 
reduce emigration. In principle, this reasoning is correct, but trade policy and aid might also 
affect other determinants of migration and so encourage flows, e.g. the creation of 
networks or the immediate effect of higher incomes that might encourage emigration 
because greater numbers of individuals can finance migration costs. Hence the net effect in 
practice is wholly unclear.  
 
In the very long run, income effects are probably the major determinant of international 
migration flows. Consider Korea, among the poorest of countries in the early 1960s. Around 
two million Koreans left for temporary employment overseas between 1960 and about 1990 
(Park 1994) and permanent exits ran to approximately 30,000 per year throughout the 
1980s (Lee 1997). By 1993-4, following what were then unprecedented rates of economic 
growth, permanent exits had fallen to 18,000 per annum, the stock of temporary workers 
abroad to just 20,000 and immigration was starting to grow – to perhaps 200,000 by 1996 
(Lee 1997).  But in Korea, GDP per head (in constant prices) had grown relative to 1960 by 
73 per cent in 1970, 191 per cent in 1980, 498 per cent in 1990 and 883 per cent in 2000 
(GDP per capita in constant local currency prices, WDI Online 10th January 2014).  
 
Aid and the openness of export markets clearly contributed to Korean growth, but the 
growth miracle consisted of far more than these changes alone. Moreover, current policy 
towards migration has horizons much shorter than four decades and so Korea is not the 
‘killer fact’ that links aid to declining emigration. A quick back-of-the-envelope calculation 
shows that the effects of aid as a policy instrument for tackling migration must be very small. 
A thoughtful account of the effectiveness of aid on economic growth, Clemens et al. (2012: 
591) suggest that ‘a one percentage-point increase in aid/gross domestic product (GDP) (at 
mean aid levels) [is] typically…followed within several years by…a 0.1–0.2 percentage-point 
increase in growth of real GDP per capita’. That is, ceteris paribus, an increase in aid of this 
magnitude takes five years or more to add one percent to a developing country’s income 
per capita.  
 
A typical income gap between developed and developing country GDP per head (measured 
in PPP) is, say, 2700 per cent of the latter’s income (this is the gap between Mozambique 
and Portugal in 2011). A one per cent increase in Mozambique’s GDP is not going to 
influence the incentives for migration – and at one percent of GDP (approximately $14.2 
billion for Mozambique in 2012), it would cost $142 million a year. Even if aid were much 
more effective than Clemens et al.’s calculations suggest, and even given the much stronger 
growth effects likely to emanate from increased trade (see, for example, Winters and 
Masters, 2013), the qualitative story would not be much changed inside several decades. 
                                                            
8 (Migration News, February 2000 Volume 7 Number 2, 
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2025_0_2_0). 
9 According to Morrison (1982), however, Salinas was echoing a previous President, Lopez Portillo in 1978.  
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Even should one argue that migration does not respond to simple income gaps but to more 
subtle differences in welfare and opportunity, these are still massive between rich and poor 
countries and it is hard to believe that aid will address them in anything other than the very 
long run.  
 
Use of a second envelop might allow one to compare the aid-or trade-induced gain in 
income with the overall relationship between national migration and national income, as 
sometimes represented by the so-called migration hump. The migration hump is far from 
uncontentious (see Lucas, 2005 Chapter 2, for example). To the extent that it exists, 
however, at incomes below about $7,500  per head, further increases in income appear to 
encourage migration – probably by directly or indirectly relaxing financing constraints – and 
even once over the hump, the migration-reducing impact of income growth will initially be 
small.  
 
The links between development and migration are surveyed by Nyberg–Sørensen et al. 
(2002) and de Haas (2007), both of whom conclude, for several reasons, that the hope that 
development will stem the tide of migrants from low and lower-middle income countries is 
a vain one. Early discussions essentially unpacked the aid-migration relationship into its 
indirect links, but more recently, economists have estimated reduced form relationships 
running directly from aid to emigration (from developing countries). Such direct estimates 
of the effects of trade on migration are very scarce, and while several authors explore 
whether trade and migration are substitutes or complements, explicitly recognising that 
causation may run from trade to migration, none has been able convincingly to separate 
that link from the opposite one discussed above.10  
 
Aid 
An early, thoughtful and partly quantitative discussion of aid and migration is Morrison 
(1982). He observes the likelihood of considerable heterogeneity between cases, but argues 
that there is little to suggest that realistic improvements in development would curtail 
migration to the USA, even over decades. He reports some suggestive evidence that ‘good 
jobs’ are a way of accumulating the money required to finance emigration from the 
Dominican Republic and that the ‘social, commercial and political ties’ engendered by aid, 
also contribute to increases in migration flows, initially by reducing costs and/or information 
deficits. He identifies aid-financed employment programmes as the most likely to ease 
migration pressures, but concedes that ‘given the relative magnitude of foreign assistance, 
it cannot be expected that migration “push” factors will be arrested’ (Morrison 1982: 15). 
Rhoda (1983) makes somewhat similar points about the improbability of stemming rural to 
urban migration by means of rural development programmes.   
Faini and Venturini (1993) take up the same issues a decade later, but from a more macro-
economic perspective. Citing Stanton Russell and Teitelbaum (1992), they argue that income 
growth may fail to curtail emigration because it relaxes credit constraints and that, given 
that the latter are more frequently binding in the poorest countries, we should expect to 
see a migration hump. They then offer a simple regression exercise on four European 
                                                            
10 Faini, Zimmerman and de Melo (1999) contains several chapters on the substitute/complement question 
and Del Río and Thorwarth (2009) offer an interesting discussion of NAFTA and illegal Mexican-US migration. 
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countries that supports this expectation. Although they are careful not to over-claim the 
results from their exercise, this paper has been heavily cited in favour of the view that trade 
liberalisation and aid are not suitable instruments for controlling migration. 
An important innovation in this area of research is to conduct the analysis at the level at 
which migration decisions are made, i.e. at the individual or household level. Angelucci 
(2004) studies the Mexican conditional cash transfer programme Progresa (now continued 
as Oportunidades), which is targeted at poor rural households. The programme includes an 
unconditional nutrition support grant and some (larger) schooling subsidies that are 
conditional upon attendance in the last four years of primary school and the first three years 
of secondary school. Angelucci categorises the nutrition and primary education grants as 
unconditional, the latter on the grounds that almost all families would continue their 
children’s education to the end of primary school anyway, while considering the secondary 
schooling grant as genuinely conditional. As discussed above, unconditional transfers may 
discourage migration by increasing its opportunity cost (making staying put more attractive), 
or encourage it by relaxing credit constraints on financing migration. The latter effect would 
be stronger for international than for internal migration because it is costlier. The 
conditional secondary education grants also increase income and relax credit constraints, 
but additionally incentivise behaviour that requires families to remain in Mexico. Progresa is 
additionally attractive from a research perspective since in 1998 and 1999, the years 
examined, eligibility for Progresa grants varied across space, grant levels showed 
considerable heterogeneity across eligible households and grants were large for poor 
families (e.g. for secondary school attendance grants rose to around two-thirds of the wage 
that a teenager might otherwise earn).  
While Angelucci’s results are not very well determined statistically, they are strong enough 
to suggest some very interesting forms of behaviour. The programme, for example, is 
associated with an increase in average international migration but not average domestic 
migration. This effect is evident largely for households that previously did not have any 
migrants. Moreover, migration occurred after the transfer of small sums, suggesting that 
the grants were used to underpin borrowing to finance migration. Households receiving 
large grants for secondary schooling, on the other hand, showed reduced international 
migration with Progresa, suggesting that the conditions mattered. Moreover, migration was 
not enhanced, as one might have expected, once schooling was finished and the condition 
no longer bound. In other words, the effect appeared permanent. Since around one-third of 
Mexican international migration comprises individuals aged between 13 and 19, such effects 
could influence overall migration.   
The obvious import of these results is that ‘aid’ targeted at households can affect migration 
outcomes. The bulk of the aid and migration literature operates at an aggregate level 
though, which is clearly different. For at least some developing countries, however, 
conditional cash transfers are supported by donors either directly (they pay for the 
programme), or indirectly (they support other activities so that government money can be 
devoted to the conditional cash transfer). Angelucci’s results therefore suggest that while 
some transfers tend toward encouraging emigration, that need not necessarily be so if 
conditions are drawn up with sufficient subtlety. 
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An influential cross-country study that relates migration directly to aid flows is Berthélemy, 
Beuran and Maurel (2009). They postulate a two equation model in which the stock of 
migrants from developing country i, in developed country j, is potentially influenced by 
bilateral aid flows, because aid increases the amount of contact between residents of the 
two countries, by i’s total aid receipts because these might relax a budget or liquidity 
constraint and by j’s policies towards migration in general. They estimate a gravity model 
explaining migration as a function of each partner’s GDP and population, bilateral trade 
flows and a series of control variables capturing the cultural and political proximity of the 
bilateral relationship (e.g. a previous colonial link or sharing a common language). To these 
they add the bilateral aid flow, i’s total aid inflow and a measure of j’s openness to 
immigrants. Berthélemy et al. recognise the possible endogeneity of bilateral aid. To this 
end, the authors  estimate a second equation modelling aid as a function of i’s GDP per head, 
population and institutional development – the usual variables used to explain aid flows – j’s 
total aid expenditure, i and j’s bilateral trade and historical links. This equation seeks to 
explain the amount of aid, given that an aid flow exists, but not the selectivity process, 
whereby donors choose the recipients of their aid, which they assert is unimportant.   
The results obtained from estimating this model on a cross section of 22 OECD migrant-
recipient countries and 187 sending countries, suggest strongly that both bilateral aid and i’s 
total aid receipts have significantly positive impacts on migrant stocks. A 10 percent 
increase in bilateral aid is associated with (perhaps causes) an approximately 3 per cent 
increase in the bilateral migrant stock, while a 10 per cent increase in total aid is associated 
with approximately a 1.5 per cent increase in the migrant stock. The migration policy effect 
is also significant with more liberal policies inducing greater migration. Berthélemy et al. 
investigate the migration hump by allowing for the effects of GDP per head on migration to 
be non-linear and add to it by recognising that their model also allows an indirect effect 
whereby, as developing countries get richer, their aid flows decline thereby reducing 
migration. The turning point of the combined effect is around $US7,300 in terms of 2000 
PPP prices, which they argue is approximately the same level as other scholars have found in 
terms of nominal US dollars.  
An interesting disaggregation is between skilled workers (with secondary and tertiary 
education) and unskilled workers. The latter are more responsive to total aid and less 
responsive to bilateral aid than the former. This re-enforces Berthélemy et al.’s preferred 
interpretation of their results – namely that total aid operates on the budget/liquidity 
constraint (which we expect to be far tighter for poorer/less skilled workers), while bilateral 
aid operates at least partly on the basis of making connections (which are typically more 
important for skilled workers). 
A potential problem that Berthélemy et al. recognise in their specification, is that their 
dependent variable is the migration stock – the number of people in country j born in 
country i – which is determined over many years, whereas their aid variables refer to 
averages over five or ten years. For example, in their migration data (from Parsons et al. 
2007) the country that provided the most emigrants in 2000 is the UK, almost certainly due 
to the length of time over which Britons have been emigrating for reasons quite unrelated 
to inflows of foreign aid. Two further problems according to Azam and Berlinschi (2009) are 
the control variables that Berthélemy et al. choose to include and their failure to allow 
adequately for the endogeneity of aid. Almost unremarked, Azam and Berlinschi switch 
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from a stock to a flow measure of migration and focus on aggregate rather than bilateral 
immigration. They seek to explain aggregate inflows of migrants from low and lower-middle 
income countries to 22 OECD countries from 1995 to 2003. Their control variables in the 
migration flow equation are GDP per head, social expenditures and unemployment in j, the 
stock of native born people from the sending countries in j and a set of fixed effects 
capturing time invariant characteristics of receiving countries. With no correction for 
endogeneity, they replicate Berthélemy et al.’s positive effect of aid on migration (albeit not 
significant in this exercise). However, when they instrument aid flows, they instead find 
large negative effects, i.e. that aid discourages immigration. 
This, of course, is exactly the result that popular debate and the politicians hope for, but 
unfortunately for them, Azam and Berlinschi’s results are not convincing. Their instruments 
for aid, which, recall, ought to explain aid flows, while not having any direct effect on 
migration, are the recipient country’s public expenditure on order and security and the 
percentage of right-wing members in the parliament, each of which they show to have a 
positive effect on aid flows. The difficulty is the ease with which one can imagine that 
countries with strong right-wing parliamentary representation and high law and order 
spending make unattractive destination for migrants, and so have lower immigration ceteris 
paribus than other countries. In Azam and Berlinschi’s estimates, this direct negative effect 
is falsely attributed to aid. Thus while Azam and Berlinschi offer an interesting discussion of 
migration and the effectiveness of aid (the issue on which their work aims to contribute), it 
does not overturn the widespread finding that aid to low and lower middle income 
countries is more likely to encourage emigration.  
Another off-shoot of Berthélemy et al. (2009) is Moullan (2013), who analyses the medical 
brain drain and health-related overseas aid flows. Moullan analyses a panel comprising eight 
years (1998-2005), 17 destination countries and 192 source countries, using a model which 
relates the annual outflow of physicians from sending countries (strictly the pseudo-flow 
derived by differencing stock data), to receipts of health aid over the three preceding years 
together with some controls. The relationship between the two appears to be positive in a 
simple OLS regression, but when he allows for the endogeneity of aid by applying General 
Method of Moments (GMM), it turns out to be significantly negative. In fact, in the long run, 
the effect is large. A doubling of health aid reduces the outflow of physicians by 71 per cent. 
Interestingly, Moullan finds that aid in the form of technical assistance is more effective 
than financial aid in stemming outflows. He speculates that this is because financial aid is 
vulnerable to both fungibility and predatory or inefficient bureaucracies, which reduce the 
net amounts getting through to health services. It may also arise if the medical brain drain 
reflects physicians’ frustration with their inability to get good training or to provide good 
health services at home, as well as their low rewards as is often claimed (Kangasniemi et al. 
2007). One might also question the ability of GMM to really neutralise endogeneity (see, for 
example, Clemens et al. 2012), but in fact Moullan’s result is perfectly consistent with the 
general results of Berthélemy et al. Physicians are much less subject to budget or liquidity 
constraints than are less skilled workers, and the links from health aid to physicians’ welfare 
in the absence of migration are much more direct and easily internalised than are those 




We assess the evidence as showing fairly strongly that aid flows to low and lower-middle 
income countries will tend to encourage rather than discourage emigration. Nonetheless, as 
we noted above, and as the image captures so crisply, politicians persist in believing or 
wishing the opposite was true.11 The most evident manifestation of that desire is the 
European policy of co-development, a tortured combination of development and migration 
policies – that aspires to reconcile the interests of developing countries in terms of 
leveraging migration for development – and the overwhelming desire of European policy-
makers to curtail inflows of immigrants, especially illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers, 
but also, in truth, legal labour migrants.12 The torture reflects the near impossibility of 
reconciling these interests, the divisions among European bureaucrats about development 
policy and the sensitivity of discussing migration without being (or appearing to be) racist, or 
at least condescending about developing country residents.  
The essence of the term ‘co-development’ in the migration context, is captured in the 
Conclusion of the European Council Meeting in Tampere in 1999, which stated the EU’s 
need for: 
‘a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and 
development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires 
combating poverty, improving living standards and job opportunities, preventing 
conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human 
rights …Partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the 
success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-development’ (European 
Council, 1999, paragraph 11, quoted by van Selm, 2004)’ 
Van Selm (2004) gives a fascinating account of the evolution of the European policy 
positions around co-development since 1998. There was always more to it than just 
incentivising developing countries to introduce policies to reduce emigration in return for 
flows of foreign assistance, but this aspect was never far from the surface. In principle, other 
elements could include policies to encourage remittance flows and other diaspora 
contributions to development, return programmes, repatriation agreements for asylum 
seekers, more active policies to discourage illegal migrants from setting off for Europe, 
‘ethical’ recruitment whereby Europe did not poach skilled workers (notably medical staff) 
and easier visa formalities for those workers who were permitted to migrate (Weil 2002). 
But as Weil shows, actual policy fell a long way short of such aspirations.   
The initial European statements were pretty direct about curtailing migration flows. For 
example, an Austrian Strategy Paper for the Presidency in 1998 states that EU migration 
policy ‘must obviously cover…. Reduction of migratory pressure in the main countries of 
origin’ (van Selm 2004). However, over time, the rhetoric became a little more conciliatory 
and policies became a little more developing country-oriented, although at the cost of 
becoming much vaguer – see for example Reslow (2010), on the ‘Global Approach to 
Migration’ and the ‘Policy Plan on Legal Migration’, both of 2005. This was partly in 
                                                            
11 Or maybe they just pretend to wish that. In the field of international trade policy, Jagdish Bhagwati (1988) 
has coined the phrase ‘porous protection’ to cover precisely those cases where policy makers pursue 




response to complaints from developing countries – for example, there was considerable 
friction with Morocco (Reslow, 2010) – and partly because of the resistance of the 
development agencies of the European Commission and national administrations to having 
aid monies devoted to curtailing legitimate migration, especially that of asylum seekers who 
may be fleeing human rights abuses.  
The difference between co-development and the more general discussion above is that the 
former supplements the hope that development will curtail migration flows, with the 
explicit orientation of aid flows towards policies that will have that effect. During the 2000s, 
the volume of aid increased quite substantially and significantly faster than most elements 
of government expenditure. Home Affairs and Justice Ministries hoped to use some of that 
resource for migration policies, while development specialists resisted – often citing the 
requirements that for the OECD to count a flow as aid (and the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee is the official arbiter of what does so count), it must be focussed on 
the recipient’s development needs.  
Despite the objections by aid agencies, however, aid has been geared to reducing migration 
in quite significant amounts, as Adepoju, van Noorloos and Zoomers (2009) report.13 For 
example, the EU had ‘to provide substantial assistance to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of control efforts’ in Morocco. The EU-Mali migration control agreement 
signed in 2006 promised €426 million in aid over 2008-13. Spain ‘offered Gambia and 
Guinea €5 million each in direct development aid in exchange for signing global migration 
agreements involving re-admission, migration control and labour migration’. Finally, in 2003 
the UK and Spain suggested punitive cuts in aid flows against countries that failed to 
‘actively collaborate in the fight against illegal migration’, although other members blocked 
the policy. 
Because of the difficulties of devising a counter-factual, it is impossible to evaluate the 
effectiveness of co-development. Certainly we know of no attempts to do so. Adepoju et al. 
(2008) report that in 2001, 500 immigrants volunteered to return to Mali from France in 
return for US$3,600 each to start a business, and that after two years 80 per cent of them 
were still in business. What we do not know, of course, is how many of them were intending 
to return anyway. 
It is easy to see where the idea of co-development comes from – the application of an 
instrument concerning developing countries (aid) to an objective concerning developed 
countries (that they stop their people from coming to Europe). It is gradually evolving 
towards a more constructive and co-operative form, but only slowly and it is difficult at 
present to see it as either elegant or successful. Developing countries are generally not 
willing participants and the bulk of the expenditure is fairly obviously devoted to developed 
not developing country objectives and should not be considered as aid. Flows of resources 
may thus buy a reduction in migration, but only by spending on what are basically coercive 
measures; the reductions do not arise because aid, properly conceived, reduces migration.  
                                                            
13 Not all financial support for migration control policies in developing countries was billed as aid, but we do 





We have reviewed the literature on some of the connections between international trade, 
international migration and international aid. It is a flawed and frustrating literature but this 
is because the subject is complex and resistant to many of the recent advances in economic 
methodology based on micro-economic data. It does not reflect a lack of interest – indeed it 
is now quite a large and active literature – and that is because migration is becoming one of 
the most sensitive and contentious policy issues to confront economists. This in turn means 
that the profession cannot turn its back on the question in a fit of methodological purity, but 
instead must do the best job it can in difficult circumstances.  
The fundamental challenge is identifying causation – a necessary step if one is to make 
useful contributions to policy. General equilibrium theory implies that everything potentially 
depends on everything else, but the elegant neo-classical theory of international trade says 
more – namely that international migration and international trade are perfect substitutes, 
such that you need only one of them to achieve exactly the outcome that you would get 
with the other. Thus empirical work, which observes outcomes and seeks to infer causes, 
faces a Sisyphean task. Fortunately, however, the assumptions of the neo-classical model 
are manifestly not true and we can identify many ways in which trade and migration are 
linked either indirectly or directly. The literature essentially tries to quantify these links and 
to insulate itself as best it can against the possibility that other causal channels are in play. 
Nearly all the extant empirical results suggest that migration and trade are positively related 
and considerable ingenuity has gone into trying to identify the relevant causal channels. 
Migrants may affect trade directly by demanding products from their home countries 
and/or facilitating trade with other countries via their information about or networks in 
those countries. Different elements of trade are potentially affected by these different links 
to different extents and different sorts of migrants may deliver them in different mixes. By 
exploiting these differences, economists have started to map out the details of the direct 
(i.e. non-general equilibrium) links between the two. Thus empiricists have sought 
identification by examining differences in the sensitivity of trade to migration across product 
types, geographical distance, firm vs. personal networks, and migrant characteristics. One 
persistent result is that migrants have a stronger pro-trade effect when other pro-trade 
features – such as sound institutions, the rule of law, common language or shared cultural 
background – are weak or missing. 
Turning to aid and migration, we observe the strength and ubiquity of the wish that aid 
flows from rich to poor countries might curtail the flow of people in the opposite direction. 
Little of the evidence lends weight to this hope and indeed most seems to suggest that aid 
increases migration – probably either because it raises incomes and hence relaxes 
constraints on financing emigration or because it results in more frequent interactions and 
network-formation between donor and recipient countries. Nevertheless, European policy 
makers have sought to leverage aid to reduce migration through policies of so-called co-
development, which, inter alia, use donor finance to fund or incentivise policies that 
operate on emigration directly. We note that this has been neither elegant nor successful.  
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Clearly the literature is primarily devoted to quantifying the effect of international migration 
on international trade and the effect of international aid on international migration. We 
argue that this is because these links are both easier to isolate and identify, while also being 
of great policy relevance. While there is a small literature on the link from trade to 
migration, it fails to convince. This is a strong candidate for future research however. Future 
research on all links is likely to be facilitated by richer data, especially more detailed micro-
economic data on migrants, which includes their histories and their activities. Such data are 
unlikely to be collected for other purposes, however, so it will require a concerted effort by 
academics and funders of research to generate them, which given the topicality of migration 
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